










Harnessing Windfall Revenues: 




FREDERICK VAN DER PLOEG 
ANTHONY J. VENABLES 
 
 
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2571 








An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Harnessing Windfall Revenues: 





A windfall of natural resource revenue (or foreign aid) faces government with choices of how 
to manage public debt, investment, and the distribution of funds for consumption, particularly 
if the windfall is both anticipated and temporary. We show that the permanent income 
hypothesis prescription of an ever-lasting increase in consumption financed by borrowing 
ahead of the windfall and then accumulating a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) is not optimal 
for capital-scarce developing economies. Such countries should accumulate public and private 
capital to accelerate their development and, only if the windfall is large relative to initial 
foreign debt, is it optimal to build a SWF. The optimal time profile of consumption is biased 
towards the near future, as compared to the permanent income hypothesis. Outcomes depend 
on instruments available to government. We study cases where the government can make 
lump-sum transfers to consumers; where such transfers are impossible so optimal policy 
involves cutting distortionary taxation in order to raise investment and wages; and where 
Ricardian consumers can borrow against future revenues, in which case the policy response to 
possible over-consumption is a high level of investment in infrastructure. 
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Over the period 2000-05 exports of hydro-carbons and minerals accounted for more than 50% 
of goods exports in 36 countries.  In 18 of these, revenues from natural resources contributed 
more than half of total fiscal revenue (IMF 2007).  These earnings figures increased 
enormously during the commodity boom of 2006-08, before falling back.  At the same time 
new countries have made major resource discoveries – for example oil in Brazil, Ghana, and 
Uganda.   A temporary windfall of natural resource revenues (or foreign aid) poses numerous 
policy challenges. Should the revenues be used for government investment in public 
infrastructure to stimulate economic activity? Should the government use the windfall to 
reduce government debt and thereby lower interest rates and boost private sector investment? 
Should the extra income be used to provide more education, health care and other public 
goods to improve the quality of life or transferred directly to citizens through tax cuts or 
citizen dividends? Alternatively, revenues could be used to transform exhaustible resource 
assets into interest-earning foreign assets by setting up a Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) for 
future generations. This is a bewildering array of policy options and the most appropriate 
option depends on what stage of development the economy is and what constraints the 
economy faces.  
The conventional consumption smoothing and debt management guidelines based on 
the permanent income hypothesis are familiar from the tax smoothing literature (Barro, 1979) 
or the optimal use of the current account (e.g. Sachs 1981).  These arguments underlie much 
of the advice for the setting up of a SWF proffered by the International Monetary Fund (e.g. 
Davis et al., 2002; Barnett and Ossowski, 2003; Segura, 2006; Leigh and Olters, 2006; Olters, 
2007; Basdevant, 2008). Although the main insights of this advice are sound, they ignore 
essential problems of developing economies struggling to grow from a low base and in the 
face of various market failures, and may therefore be only of limited relevance. 
  Our objective is to provide a rigorous analysis of how to address these policy choices 
in relatively poor countries which are capital scarce and have less than perfect access to 
capital markets. We focus on welfare-maximizing government choices between three broad 
options: using the windfall for private (or public) consumption; spending on public assets that 
raise income and the marginal productivity of private investment; and altering the country’s 
foreign asset/ debt position.  We look at outcomes with different sets of policy instruments 
available and in a series of increasingly complex economic environments.  These options 
provide different time-profiles of ultimate consumption benefit and elicit different private 
sector investment responses.  While we focus on responses to windfalls, our analysis of these 
choices is of more general interest for policy formulation, particularly in developing 
economies. 2 
 
  Central to our analysis are several features that we think are important in many 
developing countries.  The first is that the country is capital scarce and faces an interest rate 
premium in borrowing from international credit markets.  It therefore has a high domestic 
interest rate, low capital-labour ratio, little investment in public infrastructure, and low wages 
and per capita income.  We model this by assuming that capital-scarce countries are not price 
takers in international capital markets, but face an interest premium the size of which depends 
on the level of foreign debt.  A country with low foreign debt has a small risk of default and 
can borrow on international markets at the world interest rate. But beyond a certain level of 
foreign indebtedness, it faces an upward-sloping supply schedule of foreign debt.  The 
premium might be a consequence of the perceived likelihood of default, although we do not 
model this explicitly.  In the absence of a foreign exchange windfall, developing economies 
are on a trajectory of capital accumulation, debt reduction, and rising consumption, and we 
examine how the windfall can be optimally used to alter this trajectory. 
The second feature concerns the behaviour of households in the economy.  In many 
countries households find it hard to borrow against future wage income so Ricardian debt 
neutrality is unlikely to hold. To capture this, we suppose that households have no access to 
capital markets, living entirely from current wage income and government transfers. The 
presence of credit-constrained households means that there is a role for government to smooth 
consumption by varying taxes paid by or subsidies given to these households.  This may 
involve building a SWF to pay a continuing stream of citizen dividends. In a final section we 
remove this assumption, and allow households access to capital markets.  However, they may 
not internalise other imperfections in the economy, so government policy has to address 
possible over-consumption from the resource boom. 
  The third imperfection arises from the set of policy instruments that government has.  
We explore a number of different cases, including those where lack of lump-sum transfers or 
other first best instruments mean that government is obliged to use distortionary taxation or 
other second best policies. 
To focus on the main public finance issues at hand, we abstract from many important 
elements of the problem. We use a single-sector model in which there are no problems in 
absorbing expenditure, either from an appreciation of the real exchange rate and its adverse 
impact on the traded sector (the Dutch disease, Corden and Neary, 1982; van Wijnbergen, 
1984; Sachs and Warner, 1997) or from supply bottlenecks in particular domestic sectors such 
as construction.  We abstract from political economy concerns.  And most critically, we work 
in an environment of certainty, so that resource revenue volatility and associated 
precautionary motives are ignored. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 first sets up the benchmark for a 
country in which the home interest rate is pegged to the world interest rate and whose citizens 3 
 
are unable to smooth consumption but whose government can do it for them. Application of 
the permanent income hypothesis shows that it is best to use temporary windfall revenue to 
have an immediate and permanent boost to citizen dividends and private consumption, this 
being paid for by borrowing ahead of the windfall and then by the interest from a SWF 
accumulated during the windfall.  
Section 3 analyses the best way to harness an anticipated windfall in capital-scarce 
developing countries which face an interest rate above the world interest rate.  Full 
consumption smoothing is no longer optimal.  Instead, an immediate increase in consumption 
is followed by rapid debt reduction in order to reduce the interest rate. With small windfalls, 
the economy’s growth path is accelerated, but no SWF is built up. Only if windfalls are large 
relative to initial debt will it be optimal to build an SWF and associated permanent increase in 
consumption. In both these cases consumption is relatively more skewed towards current 
(poorer) generations than is the case with the permanent income hypothesis benchmark.  In a 
capital-scarce country the gains from growing more rapidly towards the long-run level of 
consumption outweigh those from raising the long-run level through permanent returns on an 
SWF. 
 Section 4 develops a richer model of the non-resource economy and of the policy 
options faced by government, adding investment in public infrastructure and income taxation 
to the menu of government options.  If lump-sum transfers are not possible, the government 
has to use the distortionary income tax to finance infrastructure.  The optimal response to 
resource revenue is to cut the tax rate and encourage private investment, thereby raising the 
wage and consumption.  This is accompanied by a longer term build up in public 
infrastructure.  Section 5 alters the model to allow domestic consumers access to credit 
markets.  This creates the possibility that, however prudent government may be, Ricardian 
consumers may over-expand consumption once the windfall is known.  Government can 
respond by an asset holding subsidy or, if this is not available, by committing a higher level of 
expenditure to public infrastructure rather than putting resource revenue in a SWF. 
Section 6 concludes, summarises our guidelines for how to cope with windfall 
revenue in a developing economy, contrasts them with the advice given by some international 
bodies, and discusses possible extensions. 
  
2. Benchmark: the permanent income hypothesis 
 
We first consider a small open economy that can borrow or lend unlimited amounts at the 
world interest rate. This economy has exogenous and constant non-resource output Y. 
Consumers receive a lump-sum transfer or citizen dividend T from the government so their 
consumption is given by C = Y + T.  The government is the only agent in the economy that 4 
 
has access to the international capital market, so foreign debt F corresponds to public debt. It 
chooses transfers T and public consumption G to maximise utility of its citizens, 
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≡− ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ∫ where ψ ≥ 0 is the weight given to public 
consumption, σ  is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the rate of time preference 
is ρ.  Maximisation is subject to the budget constraint  * Fr FG TN = ++−= &  
* rFGCY N ++−−, with fixed initial debt  F0 and exogenous world interest rate r*,  
assumed to equal the rate of time preference,  ρ = r*.  N stands for the flow of windfall 
revenue from the sale of resource or foreign aid, all of which accrues to government.   
The conditions for optimal government policy are familiar. The intertemporal 
efficiency condition states that consumption of government and its citizens are smoothed over 
time,  0 GC == && , and that lump-sum transfers adjust to achieve this. The intratemporal 
efficiency condition demands that public and private consumption move up and down 
together,  . GC
σ ψ =  Combining these conditions with the present-value budget constraint 
gives 
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P(t) is the permanent level of resource revenue at each date, defined as the amortised 
value of the stream of future revenues,  () () * e x p * ( ) () d
P
t Nt r r ztN zz
∞
≡− − ∫ . Debt 
accumulation/decumulation equal to the difference between the permanent level and current 
flow of resource wealth,  ) ( ) ( ) ( t N t N t F P − = & ensures that  ) ( * ) ( t F r t N P −   is held 
constant, as can be seen by differentiating the definition of permanent resource revenue to 
give  ( ) ) ( ) ( * ) ( t N t N r t N P P − = & , and hence  . 0 ) ( * ) ( = − t F r t N P & & Aggregate spending 
equals permanent resource revenues plus production income minus interest on foreign debt, 
i.e., () () () * () ,
P Ct Gt N t Y r Ft += + −  and the division between private and public 
spending depends on the relative weight given to public consumption. The non-resource 
primary deficit must simply equal the permanent level of resource revenues. 
Figure 2.1 summarises the responses derived in (1) to an anticipated temporary 
windfall with revenue flow given by the step function N.   This flow of revenue is announced 5 
 
(A) at date t = 0; it starts to flow at some date at or beyond t = 0 which we refer to as the date 
of extraction (E) and ceases flowing, or is depleted (D), at some later date.  The vertical axis 
measures income flows, so an economy with initial debt F0 (illustrated with F0 > 0) has an 
associated income flow (negative debt service) of −r*F0.   Permanent resource revenue is 
given by curve N 
P. This rises as the date of extraction comes closer, and falls once extraction 
begins, going to zero when the windfall ends. There is a permanent rise in public spending 
equal to the permanent value on discovery of the windfall; prior to the discovery T + G = r* 
F0  and following the discovery this jumps to T + G = r* F0 +N 
P(0), as illustrated by the 
horizontal line T + G.  Ahead of the windfall revenue, the country borrows abroad, with the 
path of debt illustrated by − r*F, this mirroring the shape of N 
P as  *
P TGN rF += − .  
Debt rises until the windfall revenue comes in, at which date the country starts paying off debt 
and eventually builds up assets abroad sufficient to sustain the permanent increase in T + G.   
 
 
Figure 2.1: Use of Sovereign Wealth Fund to manage temporary windfall revenue 

















In summary, the permanent income hypothesis suggests that the country runs a 
current-account deficit when it anticipates future windfall revenue, then pays off foreign debt 
and builds a SWF by running a current-account surplus during the temporary windfall.  Total 
spending (public consumption plus citizen dividends) rises immediately upon news of the 
windfall, one-for-one with the permanent level of windfall revenue. The foreign assets that 
are built up at the end of the windfall generate just sufficient interest revenue to finance the 
permanent rise in public spending. This policy of borrowing, then saving and finally living of 
the return on the SWF thus transforms an anticipated, temporary windfall revenue into a 
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permanent increase in aggregate spending, where the amount devoted to citizen dividends and 
private consumption decreases with the weight given to public consumption.  
 
3. Developing economies: departure from the permanent income hypothesis 
 
The benchmark of using debt to smooth consumption may be applicable for countries able to 
borrow or lend unlimited amounts at a given world interest rate.  Yet most developing 
economies are capital scarce and have high domestic interest rates.  They are unable to 
remedy this by international borrowing, as they are likely to face a high and increasing 
interest premium on such borrowing.  We capture this with a supply schedule of foreign debt, 
where for low values of foreign indebtedness the home interest rate equals the world interest 
rate and for high levels of indebtedness the home interest rate rises above the world rate. 
The empirical rationale for this is illustrated in Figure 3.1(a) which shows a positive 
relationship between interest rate spreads and the ratio of public and publicly guaranteed debt 
to GNI.   
 
Figure 3.1: Interest rate spreads and public and publicly guaranteed debt 
(a)  Unconditional*     (b)  Conditional** 
 
* The slope coefficient corresponding to the unconditional correlation for the pooled 
regression with N=165 and 25 countries is 2.270 with standard error 0.250, which is 
significantly different from zero at the 1% level, and the adjusted R
2 is 0.332. 
** The slope coefficient corresponding to the conditional correlation after controlling for 
country and time fixed effects, reserves/GDP, ln(inflation), output gap, in-default dummy and 
regional spread is somewhat smaller, namely 1.855 with standard error 0.536 which is also 
significant at the 1% level. Within-R





Following Akitobi and Stratmann (2008), we estimate the interest rate spreads after 
controlling for country and fixed effects and other relevant fiscal and monetary variables.
1 
Figure 3.1(b) shows that interest rate spreads still react strongly to debt. We also find that 
higher foreign reserves and a higher output gap have a negative impact on interest rate 
spreads while a higher probability of default has a positive impact on interest rate spreads. 
To capture this relationship in our model we assume that the domestic interest rate, r, 
is determined by: 
 
(2)   * for    and   * ( ) * for  0, rr FF rr F r FF =≤= + Π >> ≥  
 
where Π(F) is the interest rate premium and F the debt threshold below which the country is 
price taker at the world rate of interest, so  ( ) '( ) 0 and  '( ) 0, 0 FF F F F Π =Π = Π > > ≥ .
2  
Figure 3.2 portrays this supply schedule.  One can interpret Π(F) as an international premium 
on foreign debt to capture the risk of default, but we do not model that. In the 
macroeconomics literature (e.g. Turnovsky, 1997, section 2.6), it is common to close small 
open economy models by specifying a supply schedule of foreign debt which slopes upwards 
for all F.
 3 Although this is analytically convenient, it has the unattractive feature of implying 
a unique steady-state value of F at which the domestic interest rate equals the world rate; this 
level is independent of windfall revenue.  This is in contrast to the permanent income 
hypothesis under which, as we saw in section 2, countries choose their steady-state value of F 
by, for example, building a SWF.  It is to capture both the interest premium and the 
endogeneity of the steady-state value of F that we suppose that economies face a premium, 
Π(F) > 0, above some threshold level of indebtedness F , while below that level countries are 
price takers at r*.    
 
 
                                                           
1 Apart from the public and publicly guaranteed debt and GNI variables which we obtained from World 
Bank Development Indicators (April 2008), we use exactly the same years and sample of countries and 
the same explanatory variables as Akitobi and Stratmann (2008). 
2  FΠ′(F) is the terms of trade loss from a marginal increase in F.  We assume  0 F ≥  and thus 
'( ) 0, , FF F Π≥ ∀  so that there is never a terms of trade gain from reducing F.  
3 Most small open economy models with incomplete asset markets have steady states that depend on 
initial conditions and furthermore have equilibrium dynamics with a random walk component. To 
ensure stationarity and a unique steady state, one often postulates an upward-sloping supply schedule 
of foreign debt. Alternatives are to have an endogenous discount rate, convex portfolio adjustment 
costs or asset markets with a complete menu of state-contingent claims  (Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 
2003), but we do not explore these as a debt-elastic risk premium seems relevant for developing 
economies. The alternative of portfolio adjustment costs when asset holdings are different from some 
long-run level gives qualitatively similar conclusions.  8 
 
Figure 3.2: The cost of foreign borrowing: 
                            
  
  As in section 2, the government maximises utility of its citizens subject to its budget 
constraint  0 [* () ] , ( 0 ) . Fr F F T G N F F =+ Π + + − = &   The intratemporal efficiency 
condition GC
σ ψ =  can be used to write the current-account dynamics as 
 
(3)     0 [* ( ) ] ( 1 ) , ( 0 ) . Fr F F C Y N F F
σ ψ =+ Π + + − − = &  
 
Perfect consumption smoothing is no longer optimal, since the marginal cost of borrowing is 
not equal to the pure time preference rate.  The intertemporal efficiency condition (the first-
order condition for the optimal consumption path) is 
 
(4)        [* () ' () ] CC r F FF σ ρ =+ Π + Π − & . 
 
Consumption is low – and therefore rising – if the marginal cost of foreign borrowing (or 
marginal return to accumulating foreign assets) exceeds the rate of pure time preference. The 
marginal cost of foreign borrowing now includes the premium Π(F) and the value of any 
change in the premium, FΠ′(F).  At this higher rate a country with F > F  has an incentive to 
postpone consumption and save.  
Figure 3.3 portrays the phase-plane diagram corresponding to (3)-(4). Looking first at 
the lower part of the figure, the  0 F = &  locus slopes downwards; above it consumption is high 
and foreign debt increases and below it foreign debt declines over time.  0 C = & is not a line, 
but the set of all values of F ≤  F .  Countries with substantial foreign debt F > F face high 
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and constant consumption.  This system has a set of stationary points, given by the line S-S.  
For an economy which finds itself with F ≤ F , this line segment is unstable, so Q must jump 
to S-S; this is precisely the permanent income hypothesis.  For an economy with F >F  there 
is a unique saddlepath, illustrated by the dashed line.  
Our focus is on a developing country, which is initially indebted and which starts out 
at point E0 on figure 3.3. This economy faces relatively high interest rates and is gradually 
converging to its final steady state at point S.  Along the saddlepath (dashed line), the 
economy saves a lot and consumption grows.  As it pays off its foreign debt the domestic 
interest rate falls so that the propensity to save and the growth rate decline. In the long run the 
economy has paid off its foreign debt (F =F ), the domestic interest rate has fallen to the 
world interest rate, and private and public consumption have risen to their steady-state values.  
 





3.1.   A permanent windfall 
We look first at a permanent and constant flow of resource revenue.  The effect of this is to 
shift the  0 F = &  locus on figure 3.3 upwards, moving the steady state from S-S to S′-S′ with 
dynamics based around this new steady state.  If extraction occurs from the date of 
announcement, then consumption immediately jumps, C going from E0 to point A/E; the 
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What if the permanent increase in foreign windfall revenue is anticipated some time 
ahead of extraction? At announcement, consumption immediately increases to point A.  
During the interval between announcement and extraction, the government borrows abroad 
and thus pushes up foreign debt and interest rates at home as illustrated by the movement up 
and to the right.
4  Once extraction commences, the economy must be on the new saddlepath at 
point E. The government stops borrowing and starts to pay off the foreign debt. As the 
economy moves along the saddlepath to S′ the interest rate gradually falls to the world 
interest rate, economic growth tapers off and consumption rises to the new steady-state value. 
Anticipated resource revenues thus imply that a debt-ridden country adds to its debt before 
the revenue comes on stream, and this finances higher consumption.  Debt is eventually paid 
off, but – as a direct consequence of the resource windfall being permanent and constant – the 
economy does not accumulate a SWF. 
 
3.2. A temporary windfall 
The more interesting case is that in which the revenue flows from the windfall are known to 
be temporary, addressed in figure 3.4.  We assume that revenues follow a step function (as in 
figure 2.1), so the system is under the influence of the stationary at S′- S′ only during the 
period during which the resource is extracted. For simplicity in construction of this figure we 
assume that extraction and revenue flow commences at the date of announcement.   
The analysis now depends critically on whether the windfall is ‘small’ or ‘large’.  
When the windfall is small the economy jumps from E0 to E
S as the government immediately 
raises transfers to its citizens and boosts private and public consumption.  Under the dynamics 
associated with S′ the government pays off debt relatively fast; the jump in consumption is 
less than the flow of revenue.  The marginal cost of capital remains above the rate of time 
preference so consumption continues to rise.  At the date when the revenue flow stops the 
economy has to hit the original saddlepath (point D
S) and it then continues up this path to the 
steady state S. The windfall raises consumption at all dates, but does not raise the long run 
level of consumption to which the economy asymptotically converges.   In contrast to the 
permanent income hypothesis there is no SWF, since the economy’s initial low level of 
consumption means that it is optimal to use the windfall proportionately more on the current 
generation.  
 
                                                           
4 Notice that we have not allowed the announcement of the windfall to have any direct effect on the 
‘creditworthiness’ of the economy.  Such a direct effect would shift the Π(F) function indicating the 
extent to which foreign lenders are prepared to take the present discounted value of future resource 
revenues into account. We do not pursue this idea, and would argue that such a direct effect is not 
rational.  Along an optimal path the government will spend all the revenue, so any improvement in 
creditworthiness is illusory. 11 
 
Figure 3.4:  Temporary windfall and permanent spending 
 
 
A larger windfall is associated with a larger initial jump in consumption, and with the 
establishment of a SWF to finance permanently higher consumption. This is illustrated in 
figure 3.4 by the jump to point E
L.  As with the small-windfall case, during the period of 
extraction consumption is higher and debt is being repaid, but now it is optimal to repay all 
debt (reachF ) before the resource is depleted.  Consumption therefore increases until this 
point is reached and the marginal cost of capital reaches the rate of time preference.  Once 
consumption has reached its permanent value, foreign assets continue to be built up to the 
level sufficient to sustain this consumption once resource revenues cease.  At the date the 
resource runs out (point D
L), the economy becomes stationary. The economy has to reach the 
original stationary, S–S, at the date the resource is depleted and the windfall ceases, this 
determining the size of the jump to E
L.  The size of the long-run SWF is now endogenously 
determined.   For example, a higher initial debt or a smaller and less protracted windfall will 
reduce the size of the terminal SWF. The boundary between the ‘large’ and ‘small’ windfall is 
when points D
S and D
L coincide at foreign debt level F .   
Summing up, with an interest premium on foreign borrowing, perfect smoothing of 
public and private consumption is no longer optimal.  Instead of raising long-run 
consumption, optimal policy accelerates progress towards this long-run value.  While 
consumption will jump up at the date of announcement (this involving borrowing if 
announcement precedes the revenue flow), consumption does not jump the whole way to its 
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Whereas the permanent income hypothesis suggests that a SWF should be built up in 
response to a temporary windfall, this is no longer true, unless the windfall is so large that it 
moves the economy out of the regime in which it faces a premium on its foreign debt.
 5  
 
4. Public infrastructure and domestic production with foreign-owned capital 
 
The previous section made the point that, in an economy with interest rate greater than the 
rate of time preference and growing consumption, it is optimal to use revenue to accelerate 
the growth of consumption towards its steady-state value, rather than to increase that value 
through investment in a SWF.  However, the government could invest only in foreign assets, 
either by debt reduction or construction of an SWF.  We now turn to the next question.  If 
there are domestic assets – private and public capital stock – as well as foreign, how should 
optimal policy combine current consumption, debt reduction, public investment, and 
incentives to private investment, and what are the implications for the consequent growth of 
non-resource national income?  
To answer these questions we make non-resource output endogenous by including 
private capital and public infrastructure.  Non-resource domestic income is given by a 
production function with constant returns to scale with respect to private capital and labour, 
expressed as Y = f (K, S) where the labour force is normalised at unity, K denotes the private 
capital stock and S is the stock of public infrastructure.  Given the exogenous supply of 
labour, the function f(.) exhibits decreasing returns in K and S together, to rule out ever-
increasing growth. Infrastructure can be thought of as consisting not only of seaports, airports, 
roads and railroads, but also of education, health or any other public investment that boosts 
the productivity of private production.  
We retain for the moment the assumption that there are no private domestic asset 
holders.  Public infrastructure is owned by government, while private capital is rented from 
abroad from foreign owners who face the world interest rate, r*.  They are subject to host 
country income taxation at a proportional rate τ.   Profit maximisation requires that the after-
tax marginal product of capital, net of depreciation δK, equals the world interest rate, so that  
 
(5)     (1  –  τ) fK(K, S) = r* + δK      
 
                                                           
5 Flight capital as a policy choice (e.g., formation of a SWF) has been discussed before in a different 
context (Collier, Hoeffler and Pattillo, 2001; Collier and Gunning, 2005). 13 
 
The equilibrium capital stock follows from (5), and can be written as K = K(S, τ) , this giving 
wages  [ ] W (,) ( 1 )f ( (,) ,) (,) f( (,) ,) K S KS S KS KS S ττ τ τ τ ≡− − and production income 
Y(S,τ) ≡ f(K(S,τ), S). Capital stock, wages and income are all increasing S and decreasing in τ 
and, differentiating (5) and W(S, τ), the effect of a tax change on the wage rate, Wτ , satisfies 
Wτ = − Y.   
In this structure the only domestic debt is that of government, D.  It is held entirely by 
foreigners, and the interest rate becomes r = r* + П(D).
6 The dynamics of government debt 
come from the government budget constraint in the familiar way: 
 
(6)              N Y T I G rD D S − − + + + = τ &  
 
where IS is spending on infrastructure investment and the final terms are lump-sum transfers 
to consumers, income taxation and resource revenues.  The stock of infrastructure evolves 
according to  SS SI S δ =− & , with δS is the depreciation rate.  Analysis is simplified by working 
with net government assets defined as the stock of public infrastructure minus government 
debt, B ≡ S − D.
7  The budget constraint is then 
 
(6′)             0 () , ( 0 ) . S Br BS N YGT S B B τδ =− + + − − − = &  
 
with the initial value of net government assets fixed at B0.  The no-Ponzi game condition must 
be satisfied,  ( ) 0 lim ( )exp ( )d 0,
t
t Bt rv v
→∞ −= ∫ so that initial net government assets plus the 
present value of the stream of future income taxes and resource revenue must cover the 
present value of the stream of future spending on public consumption, government transfers 
and infrastructure services. 
  The government’s problem is now to choose the public capital stock S, public 
consumption G, together with the rate of income taxation τ and transfers to households T, 
where households’ consumption is C = W + T.   Its objective is social welfare, as before,  









≡− ⎜⎟ − ⎝⎠ ∫  and the constraints are the budget equation (6′), 
together with initial conditions, the no-Ponzi condition and equilibrium levels of private 
                                                           
6 Section 5 looks at the case where there are domestic asset holders, and the spread is determined by 
both public and private liabilities and sets the cost of borrowing for both private and public capital. 
7 Asset market equilibrium implies that the private and public capital stocks that are not owned by the 
government are owned by foreigners, so that foreign liabilities are given by F = K + S − B. 14 
 
capital (and hence wages and income) as captured by  K(S, τ), W(S, τ) and Y(S,τ).  The 
Pontryagin function is defined as: 
 (7)   
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with co-state for net government assets μ.  This yields the optimality conditions 
 
(7.1)      
1/ HW ( Y ) 0 , CY
σ
ττ τ μτ
− =+ + =   
(7.2)          
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and the transversality condition 
 
(7.6)            [ ] lim exp( * ) ( ) ( ) 0.
t rt t B t μ
→∞ − =  
 
We analyse this system in two stages, first looking at the case in which lump-sum transfers – 
the instrument T – are possible, and then in section 4.2 removing this instrument.   
 
4.1. Policy with lump-sum taxes/transfers  
If government can make lump-sum transfers to consumers, then it is optimal to set the income 
tax rate at zero (from (7.1) and (7.2) together with Wτ = − Y). The optimal level of public 
consumption follows from (7.2) and (7.3) as   . GC
σ ψ =   Infrastructure is set optimally to 
satisfy 
 
(7.4′)        W( , 0 ) * ( ) ' ( ) SS Sr D D D δ = +Π + Π + . 
 
The marginal value of infrastructure is simply its effect on national income which, absent 
income taxation, is its effect on the wage.  Its marginal cost is the full marginal cost of public 
borrowing including the marginal cost of the interest premium, so that the optimal level of 15 
 
infrastructure will be lower in a capital-scarce economy. The optimal path of consumption is 
as in section (3); using (7.2) in (7.5),  
 
(7.5′)   [() ' () ] CCD D D σ =Π+ Π &    for   D  > D , and  0 C = &  otherwise.        
 
Hence, in a capital-scarce economy the optimal consumption paths are tilted towards the 
future to redeem government debt, lower the interest rate, boost public and private capital 
accumulation and thus spur the process of economic development. 
The dynamic system in B and C is qualitatively similar to that in F and C illustrated 
in figures 3.3 and 3.4, although S, K, Y and W are now all changing along the optimal path.  
We therefore choose to illustrate results by simulation of an example presented in the panels 
of figure 4.1.  Time is on the horizontal axis, and scaling of the vertical axes is achieved by 




γ, where A scales long-run output to unity, and parameters are set to α = 0.4, γ =  
0.25, ρ = r* = 0.05, σ = 0.75, ψ= 0 and δK =δS = 0.05. In figures 4.1 and 4.2 Π = ρ(F+)
2 .  
Simulations are done with a reverse multiple shooting algorithm with a horizon of t* = 130 
and using the computer package GAUSS.  We assume that  D F = = 0 and that the time 
dimension is scaled such that the horizontal axis can be (loosely) interpreted as years.   
The solid lines in figures 4.1 and 4.2 give the path of an economy which starts out 
with national wealth, B0, set at half its long-run value, and which experiences no shocks.  The 
economy has positive initial foreign debt and converges smoothly to its stationary value with 
accumulation of assets, decumulation of foreign debt, falling interest rates, and rising income 
and consumption.   
The effect of a temporary anticipated ‘small’ windfall is given by the dashed lines.  
Initial asset values are as in the base case, but at year zero a flow of resource revenue between 
years 16 and 35 is announced.  The flow is equal to 8% of long-run stationary non-oil income.  
At the date of announcement it is optimal to increase consumption, and there is a 
(small) upward jump in transfers T and consumption C.  Transfers are then on a steeply rising 
path during the period prior to resource revenue flow.  (Notice that overall lump-sum transfers 
to households are negative, because of the need to finance public infrastructure).  Additional 
transfers in the interval before resource revenues start to flow have to be financed by foreign 
borrowing, and the downwards path of D flattens, leaving debt above what it otherwise would 
have been.  Higher foreign debt translates into higher r and lower S, K and non-resource 
income, Y.  
Once the revenue flow comes on stream debt D is paid off more rapidly than was the 
case absent the windfall, with the associated rapid fall in r and increase in K, S, Y and W.  16 
 
Rapidly rising wages mean that consumption growth can be maintained with T falling back.   
All the variables describing the production side of the economy cross their non-windfall path 
during the period of revenue flow, including the public capital stock. At the date when the 
windfall revenue ceases (t = 35, at the kink) domestic capital stocks are something over 10% 
higher than they otherwise would have been, and foreign debt at half the level.  At this date 
the economy reverts to its previous path, but earlier than would otherwise have been the case.  
Thus, the dashed lines converge to the same value as the solid ones, but are shifted to the left 
by some 30 time periods.  The bottom right panel of figure 4.1 compares incremental 
consumption with the resource revenue flow (step function) and illustrates clearly the periods 
of borrowing, saving, and then higher consumption, this because the economy’s development 
has been brought forward, and not because of perpetual income from an SWF.
8 
 
Figure 4.1:  Optimal development with lump-sum transfers  
 
Key: Solid lines without a windfall and dashed lines with an anticipated temporary windfall. 
 
In summary, optimal use of the windfall involves increased consumption from the 
date at which the resource is discovered, and faster asset accumulation (debt decumulation) 
from the date windfall revenue flows.  Higher public and private investment brings forward 
the economy’s development path, but does not lead to the formation of a SWF.  
 
                                                           
8   If the windfall was large enough for the interest rate to fall to r* during the period of revenue flow 
then the economy would commence construction of a SWF, as in section 3.4. 17 
 
4.2. Second best: No lump-sum taxes and subsidies 
The possibility of lump-sum transfers makes it easy for government to control the level of 
private consumption.  Without such transfers consumption can only be controlled indirectly 
via the wage rate, and two instruments affect this.  More public infrastructure raises wages 
directly and also by attracting private investment; lower distortionary taxation attracts private 
investment and raises wages.  Of course, these instruments are linked by the budget 
constraint.  Resource revenues relax this constraint, and the ensuing second-best optimal 
policy response is outlined below. 
   The optimal policy is found from the first-order conditions above, but with T = 0, so 
instead of first order condition (7.2) we have simply C = W(S, τ).  It is helpful to define the 
marginal cost of public funds as the shadow price of public funds relative to the marginal 
utility of private consumption
1/ /C
σ φμ
− ≡ .  In the preceding subsection φ = 1, but the fact 
that the government now has to raise funds by distortionary taxes means that φ  > 1.  The 
relationship between the optimal income tax and the marginal cost of public funds is given by 
equation (7.1) (using (7.2) and Wτ = − Y) as 
(7.1')    
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. 
Since Yτ < 0 a positive tax rate is associated with marginal cost of funds greater than unity.  A 
higher cost of funds depresses the demand for public relative to private consumption: 









The first-order condition for infrastructure becomes 
 
(7.4″)       [ ] W( , ) * ( ) ' ( ) SS S Sr D D D Y τ φδ τ =+ Π + Π + − . 
 
Thus, φ greater than unity raises the cost of capital which tends to reduce the optimal level of 
public infrastructure, although this may be offset as an increase in infrastructure raises income 
and tax revenue, τYS > 0.   
We once again illustrate the optimal development paths, with and without resource 
revenue, by numerical example.  Figure 4.2 describes the same economy as figure 4.1, but 
with this restricted set of instruments.  Government finance of infrastructure requires 
distortionary taxation (τ  >  0) and hence a shadow premium on public funds (φ > 1).  Along 
the development path without resources there is steady pay back of debt, increasing capital 
stock and rising income and consumption.  This is accompanied by a declining cost of public 18 
 
funds and rate of income tax as accumulation of infrastructure reduces the flow of 
infrastructure investment (relative to the size of the economy) to be financed.  The presence 
of the distortion means that income and consumption are lower at all dates (including the long 
run) than they are when lump-sum transfers can be used. 
Discovery of the resource revenue causes an immediate decrease in the marginal cost 
of public funds, as would be expected.  There is also an immediate (small) jump in 
consumption, which is then on an accelerating path.  Consumption is equal to the wage rate, 
so this jump is engineered by a lower income tax rate which attracts private capital and raises 
income.  However, the lower tax requires government borrowing which raises the cost of 
funds and causes public infrastructure investment to fall below its previous path.  It is only 
once resource revenues flow that the government is able to afford a lower tax rate, higher 
level of public infrastructure, and sharply falling level of debt.  All of these things put income 
and wages on a rapid growth path. 
It is interesting to note that the government could have increased output and wages 
either by cutting income tax or by increasing the public capital stock.  In this example the 
stock of infrastructure initially falls back as the interest rate rises before it starts to rise 
steeply. This is a consequence of the fact that a Cobb-Douglas technology (as used in the 
simulation) implies that neither the tax rate nor the marginal cost of public funds have a direct 
impact on the optimal stock of infrastructure. Equations (7.1′) and (7.4″) are particularly 
simple in this case, namely  
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where 0 < α < 1 denotes the elasticity of output with respect to K and 0 < γ < 1  the elasticity 
with respect to S.  Hence, the optimal public capital/production ratio depends only on 
parameters and the interest rate and not on the cost of funds or the tax rate.  
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Figure 4.2: Second-best optimal development. 
 
Key: Solid lines without a windfall and dashed lines with an anticipated temporary windfall. 
 
In summary, inability to raise consumption via lump-sum taxes means that the 
government must instead increase wages by a combination of lower income tax and higher 
public infrastructure.  The initial response is to lower the tax rate, but at the date when the 
windfall revenue ceases (t = 35, at the kink) domestic capital stocks (public and private) are 
approximately 20% higher than they otherwise would have been, indicating increased reliance 
on the non-resource economy to deliver additional consumption.  Comparing the bottom right 
panels of figures 4.1 and 4.2, it is noteworthy that the resource discovery is associated with a 
larger increase in consumption at all dates in the second case.  The reason is that windfall 
revenue to government allows it to reduce other distortions that are present in the economy, 
specifically the rate of income tax. 
 
5.  Using public infrastructure to avoid the Ricardian curse 
 
Up to this point government has been the only agent making choices about the intertemporal 
profile of consumption.  In practise there may also be forward-looking private agents who 
own assets and adjust savings and consumption decisions in response to current and future 
resource revenues.  This raises the possibility that Ricardian consumers may, in some sense, 
negate the effect of government policy. They fully anticipate their future shares in resource 20 
 
revenues and adjust consumption accordingly, but not necessarily optimally from a social 
perspective, a ‘Ricardian curse’.  Thus, even if the government is seeking to save a substantial 
share of resource revenues, policy may be undermined by a private consumption boom 
fuelled by private borrowing, as has happened in some countries.
9  How should government 
react to this? 
  To model this, we now assume that households are no longer credit constrained but 
may own private assets.  Aggregate private wealth is denoted by A and can be held in either 
domestic equity or government bonds which we assume to be perfect substitutes.  Thus, the 
physical assets in the economy, K + S, are owned by foreigners (foreign debt F), government 
(net assets B), and households (wealth A), so K + S = F + B + A (or K = F − D + A where D 
= S – B is government debt). Foreign liabilities F thus defined correspond to the excess of 
public debt over private bond holdings plus net import of capital. We will assume that the 
interest premium now depends on the asset position of private asset holders as well as that of 
the government, so r = r* + Π(F) = r* + Π(K+S – A – B). 
The production side of the economy is as before, except that we now assume that all 
investors face the domestic interest r (inclusive of the premium Π(F)).  For simplicity we 
ignore income taxation, so profit maximisation implies that the marginal product of capital 
equals the user cost of capital: 
 
(9)            fK(K, S) = r* + Π( K+S – A – B)+ δK . 
  
This implicitly defines K = K(S, A+B) and correspondingly production Y(S, A+B), wages 
W(S, A+B) and domestic interest rate r(S, A+B).  Capital stock, wages and production are 
increasing in S and in A + B. The interest rate is increasing S and decreasing in A + B.  For 
future reference we note that WA + KrA = 0 (see appendix).  Effects with respect to S hold 
with strict equality, but effects with respect to A + B occur only if the economy is highly 
indebted so F > F . The responses are intuitive. A higher stock of assets owned by domestic 
households, A, or the government, B, corresponds to lower foreign liabilities and thus pushes 
down the premium and the domestic interest rate. Consequently, capital, wage income and 
output increase.  A higher level of public infrastructure boosts the marginal productivity of 
capital and of labour, hence increases the demand for capital and boosts output.  As a result, 
the domestic interest rate and wage rate rise.  For given A + B, a higher public infrastructure 
also increases foreign liabilities and pushes up the domestic rate of interest.  Full details of the 
Cobb-Douglas case are given in the appendix. 
                                                           
9   Notably Kazakhstan where public saving has been offset by private borrowing (Esanov and 
Kuralbeyeva, 2009). 21 
 
Private households have access to domestic capital markets and can smooth their 
consumption C.  They are subject to two government instruments, an asset holding subsidy at 
rate τA and a lump-sum transfer of TA.  Their budget constraint is therefore 
() AA Ar A W TC τ =+ ++− & .  The privately optimal growth in consumption is proportional 
to the gap between the interest rate (inclusive of the asset holding subsidy rate) and 
households’ rate of pure time preference ρ, so that 
 
(10)       /( ) A CC r σ τρ = +− & . 
 
The government borrows and issues debt D (= S – B) at rate of interest r. The 
government budget constraint is thus,  () A AS B rB S N G T A S τ δ =− + − − −− & ,  0 ) 0 ( B B = .  
Ricardian equivalence implies that the intertemporal profile of government transfers TA does 




(11)  00 () W ( ,) () , ( 0 ) ( 0 ) . s ABr AB N S AB GC r S A B A B δ += + ++ + −−−+ + = + & &  
 
This budget constraint, together with  F = K + S − A − B and Y = W + (r + δK)K  imply that 
the trade deficit (the excess of public and private spending over production plus windfall 
revenue) plus interest on foreign liabilities equals the increase in indebtedness of the nation, 
, SK Fr FCGI I YN =+ + + +− − &   00 (0) (0) (0) . FSKA B = +− −  The no-Ponzi condition 
implies that the present discounted value of net exports of goods and services minus windfall 
revenue exports must cover initial foreign liabilities. These liabilities jump on impact if the 
government borrows for infrastructure or firms import capital. 
Social welfare depends on consumption by households and government, as before, 
and we maximise with respect to the asset holding subsidy rate τA, public consumption G, and 
public infrastructure S.  Notice that transfers or citizen dividends, TA, do not enter explicitly; 
Ricardian consumers know the combined budget constraint (11) and hence the implicit value 
of these payments.  Maximisation is subject to (11) and (10) for the state variables A+B and 
C, with respective co-states and μ and λ. Given that the Pontryagin function is defined by 
 
                                                           
10  Although noting that the asset holding tax still affects private consumption, as in (10). 22 
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The first-order conditions are: 
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with the transversality conditions 
 
(12.6)        () [ ] lim exp( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 and lim exp( ) ( ) ( ) 0.
tt tt A tB t tt C t ρμ ρλ
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5.1. Lump-sum taxes and optimal asset holding subsidy 
We first look at the case is in which government can control private consumption growth by 
using the asset holding subsidy rate τA.  The first-order condition (12.1) then implies that λ = 
0, and hence from (12.2) and (12.5) 
1/ 1/ . CG
σ σ μψ
−− ==   Consumption paths follow from 
(12.4) as  
 
(13.1)             [ ] / / W ( )r   and   AA CC GGr A B S G C
σ σσ ρ ψ == + + + − − = && . 
 
The optimal level of public infrastructure is implicitly given in (12.3), 
 
 (13.2)                ( ) S S S r S B A r W − + − + = δ ,  
 
indicating that S increases with the stock of private plus public assets, via an effect on the 
domestic rate of interest.   Analogous to previous cases the optimal path of the economy is 
described by differential equations for assets, (A+B, equation (11)) and for C (equation 
(13.1)), with values of G, S, and hence K = K(S, A+B), Y(S, A+B), W(S, A+B), r = r(S, A+B) 
being computed at each instant.  Notice that expressions (13.1) and (13.2) for consumption 23 
 
growth and infrastructure are more complex than the analogous equations in the previous 
section, (7.4′) and (7.5′), because debt now affects the rate at which the private sector 
borrows, giving rise to the dependence of K, Y, r and W on (A+B). 
Our main focus is on the asset holding subsidy, since it is this that controls the time 
profile of private consumption.  The implied optimal asset holding subsidy rate follows from 
comparison of (13.1) with (10)  
 
(13.3)               [ ] () 0 AA A A WA B S rF r τ =+ + − =≥ . 
 
Where the equality comes from the definition of F and WA + KrA = 0.  This is positive, since 
the sign in (13.3) holds with strict inequality for F  >F  ≥ 0 and equality if debt is below this 
threshold.  The intuition is that an asset holding subsidy is required because of a terms-of-
trade effect.  By saving and raising A, private agents reduce the interest rate premium that the 
economy has to pay on its foreign debt, an effect that not internalised by individual price-
taking asset holders. This interest rate change benefits the economy in aggregate (if F > 0), 
while raising wages (WA > 0) and reducing returns to domestic asset holders (rA < 0).  The 
asset holding subsidy therefore starts relatively high and, without the windfall, falls 
monotonically to zero. The effect of a resource windfall is to initially increase the asset 
holding subsidy, followed by a fall in the subsidy rate to below its level absent the resource.  
This exactly mirrors the path of outstanding debt (as in figures 4.1 or 4.2), since it is this that 
drives the terms-of-trade effect. 
   In summary, the asset holding subsidy fully corrects the distortion that arises from 
households’ failure to internalise the adverse effect of their consumption on the interest rate at 
which the economy borrows.  The government funds the optimal level of public consumption 
and infrastructure and transfers other revenue to households through citizen dividends.   Since 
private agents are Ricardian consumers facing the same cost of capital as the public sector, 
the timing of transfers is immaterial.  However, this requires all consumers to have access to 
capital markets and any macro-economic impacts of debt on interest rates to be internalised 
by the asset holding tax such that citizen dividends are optimal.  
 
5.2. Absence of an optimal asset holding subsidy 
Time-varying asset holding subsidies may be difficult to implement and are seldom seen in 
practice. We therefore turn to the case in which this instrument is unavailable and τA = 0.  
Since the return to saving is reduced there is a tendency for households to be on a 
consumption path that is too flat, involving too much consumption in the early years and too 24 
 
little saving. What is the optimal response to this situation? Since (12.1) no longer applies, 
necessary conditions are, from (10) with (12.2) – (12.5): 
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The dynamic system (11), (14.1), (14.2) and (14.4) is solved with aggregate assets as a 
predetermined variable (i.e., A(0)+B(0)=A0 + B0) and private and public consumption as jump 
variables (C(0) and G(0) free to jump), where at each point of time the interest rate is given 
by r(S,A+B) and the level of public infrastructure follows from (14.3). Since the government 
has no access to an asset holding subsidy or lump-sum transfers, it is unable to control the 
initial level of private consumption
11 and consequently the initial marginal social value of  
private consumption is free to jump at time zero (i.e., λ(0) free). The dynamic system can thus 
be solved with a standard reverse multiple shooting algorithm.  Due to the initial bias towards 
over-consumption, the social value of a marginal reduction in initial private consumption 
must be positive. Since C is a forward-looking variable, this implies that its initial co-state 
must satisfy λ(0) > 0.
12   We can show that the steady-state value of λ is zero if  0. F =
13 The 
government’s inability to use the asset holding subsidy thus means that λ is initially positive 
and then declines to the limiting value of zero.  In general λ need not converge to zero.  
The consequences of λ > 0 are seen by inspection of equations (14.2) and (14.3) for 
public consumption and infrastructure.  From (14.2), λ > 0 implies slower growth of public 
consumption G (since rA < 0) and thus a higher value of initial public consumption G(0).  And 
                                                           
11 However, the government can by varying G and S control the present value of private consumption 
PV(C) = A + B + PV(W+N) – PV(G+(r+δS)S), where PV(.) indicates the present value using the market 
rate of interest. Raising public infrastructure also boosts wages, which offsets the downward 
adjustment of the private consumption path. Private agents also realise that, if government does not 
spend the windfall, the windfall is going to accrue to them and thus spend accordingly. 
12 We use the result that at the optimum ∂U/∂C(0) = − λ(0) < 0 while ∂U/∂[A(0)+B(0)] = μ(0) > 0. 
13 In steady state (14.2) gives
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− Π= Π   Since steady state Π′ = 0 we use a limiting argument; suppose that Π = 
Π(F+ε), ε > 0, and let ε → 0 to yield steady-state value of λ = 0 if 0 F = . 
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from (14.3), λ > 0 implies a higher value of S; since rS < 0, the effect is like a lower cost of 
capital.  The only way that the government can, in the absence of the asset holding subsidy, 
dampen the consumption of Ricardian households is by itself raising spending on public 
consumption and infrastructure. This spending has a negative income effect on private 
households, and also causes foreign debt to be larger than it otherwise would be, increasing 
the interest rate and thereby increasing private saving. 
  This is illustrated in figure 5.1.
14  The top panel of this figure looks at two cases 
where there are no resource revenues.  The dashed line is if τA is set optimally, and the solid 
line if τA is constrained to be zero.  In line with the discussion above, public infrastructure is 
larger – a full 20% larger – if the asset holding subsidy is not available.  This has the effect of 
increasing indebtedness and hence interest rates.  As a consequence the paths of consumption 
and private capital stock (not illustrated) are very similar in the two cases.  Essentially, the 
government commits to public investment, debt and higher interest rates, in order to prevent 
over-consumption by the private sector.  
 
Figure 5.1: Counteracting the Ricardian curse 
 
Key: Top panel gives simulations without windfall; dashed lines give case with optimal asset 
holding subsidy and solid lines without asset holding subsidy.  
The bottom panel gives simulations without the asset holding subsidy; dashed lines are with 
the windfall, and solid lines without.  
 
                                                           
14 Parameters and production function are as in section 4 except that figure 5.1 uses Π = 0.75ρ(F+)
2 .  26 
 
The bottom panel of figure 5.1 has τA = 0, and compares variables with (dashed line) 
and without (solid line) the anticipated temporary windfall revenue.   We see that the effect of 
the windfall is to cut the stock of public infrastructure.  In this example infrastructure 
investment goes to zero for a short period and the downward-sloping section of the 
infrastructure stock schedule arises as existing infrastructure depreciates.  This perverse effect 
occurs because the windfall moves the economy closer to development and thereby reduces 
the magnitude of the distortion that we have built into the system.  In particular, resource 
wealth reduces indebtedness, and so reduces the terms-of-trade effect of private consumption 
on debt service obligations. Consumption is therefore closer to its first best optimal path and 
there is less need to control it indirectly though high spending on infrastructure. 
Two further points are noteworthy.  First, the reduction in infrastructure spending 
when the resource is discovered occurs because government is assumed to be implementing 
the second-best optimal policy prior to the windfall; such very high rates of infrastructure 
investment are not observed in most developing countries.  Second, the only reason for 
private sector over-consumption in this model is the terms-of-trade effect of changing the 
interest rate.  Other distortions affecting the time profile of private consumption (domestic 
capital market imperfections, high spreads and low returns to private saving) might not be 
mitigated by the windfall.   
 
6. Concluding remarks 
 
We have established four main results. The first is that a developing economy which is capital 
scarce with rate of interest greater than the rate of time preference and growing consumption 
should not follow the prescriptions of the permanent income hypothesis and devote the 
proceeds of a resource windfall to construction of a SWF.  It should instead invest to raise the 
rate of growth of consumption; in a poor country the gains from reaching the long-run level of 
consumption sooner outweigh those from raising the long-run level through permanent 
returns on an SWF. 
  The second concerns the composition of spending.  There should be some immediate 
increase in consumption (by transfer payments, if these are available), accompanied by 
investment in a combination of public infrastructure and debt reduction, the latter bringing 
lower interest rates and higher private investment.  If there is a substantial time lag before 
windfall revenues flow, then the immediate increase in consumption remains optimal, 
although it has the effect of increasing indebtedness and pushing further into the future the 
date at which public infrastructure and debt reduction takes place. 
  Third, if direct transfers to consumers are difficult to implement, then more of the 
windfall revenue should be devoted to public investment and to tax measures that increase 27 
 
private investment.  This is because consumption can be increased only by raising wages in 
the economy, and higher investment is the means to achieve this. 
  Finally, the prescription of citizen dividends is optimal only if households have 
access to capital markets and any tendency to private over- (or under-)consumption can be 
corrected by a time-varying asset holding subsidy (tax).  Access to capital markets means that 
consumption can be separated from the date at which transfers are made, but private 
smoothing need not be socially optimal.  This can be corrected by a time varying asset 
holding subsidy.  If this instrument is not available, then government will need to correct the 
over (or under) consumption of Ricardian consumers by other means, such as varying the 
level of investment in public infrastructure.  
  These results challenge aspects of the standard advice for handling windfall revenues, 
for example the recommendation that revenues should be used to build an SWF and, 
according to some, consumption limited to the interest on this fund (e.g., Barnett and 
Ossowski, 2003).  Developing countries have both an urgent need both for consumption to 
reduce poverty, and high-return domestic investment opportunities.  Our analysis shows how 
these factors make it optimal to use revenues to grow the domestic economy. 
Of course, the analysis abstracts from many important elements that will be the 
subject of future research. First, if windfall revenue directly impacts creditworthiness, there 
may be a danger of over-borrowing (e.g. Mansoorian, 1991; Manzano and Rigobon, 2001). 
Second, the economy may have difficulty in absorbing additional expenditure.  At the macro-
economic level there may be an appreciation of the real exchange rate and decline of the 
traded sector (e.g., Corden and Neary, 1982). At the micro-economic level maintaining and 
raising the efficiency of public expenditure is essential. Third, it is important to allow for 
endogenous optimal resource depletion and examine how the well-known Hotelling (1931) 
rule should be modified when the government faces the tough public-finance dilemmas we 
have highlighted. For example, does it still make sense to have a current-account surplus 
matching the Hotelling rents? Fourth, the government may be myopic for political reasons or 
due to competing fractions and the voracity effect (Tornell and Lane, 1999) in which case the 
government brings forward public spending and postpones taxation. Furthermore, an 
incumbent, worried about being removed from office by a political rival with preference for a 
different type of public goods, typically issues too much debt and spends too much on its own 
pet projects (Alesina and Tabellini, 1990). These political distortions are exacerbated if the 
incumbent uses the windfall to opportunistically pacify the electorate. On the other hand, 
governments may prefer to invest in public infrastructure rather than a SWF as the former is 
more difficult to be raided by future political rivals. Resource-rich countries may also get 
addicted to high public spending and find it difficult to kick the habit once resource revenues 
dry up (e.g., Leigh and Olters, 2006; Olters, 2007). 28 
 
Perhaps most importantly, resource revenues are not only uneven through time, as we 
have modelled, but also in many cases highly uncertain due to the notorious volatility of 
commodity prices and uncertainty about future extraction costs.   This creates a case for 
accumulating precautionary buffers in a Sovereign Liquidity Fund to smooth shocks. 
However, it remains important that, as we have argued in the context of certainty, revenues 
are used to grow the domestic economy and raise consumption in the short to medium term, 
and are not simply deposited abroad. 
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Appendix: Comparative statics of production (section 5). 
Profit maximisation implies fK(K, S) – δK = r =  r* + Π(K + S – A - B), this implicitly 
defining K(S, A+B).   Hence r(S, A+B) = fK(K(S, A+B), S) – δK and  
W(S, A+B) = f(K(S, A+B), S) - K(S, A+B)fK(K(S, A+B), S).  Comparative statics are; 
KA = Π’/ (Π’-fKK),   rA = Π’ fKK / (Π’-fKK),   WA = - Π’ KfKK / (Π’-fKK), so WA + KrA = 0. 
For the Cobb-Douglas case:  
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Also, Y = W(S, A+B)/(1−α) ≡ Y(S, A+B) with Y0 .
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